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21ST CENTURY PENSIONS:

THE RISK, THE HEDGE AND THE DUTY TO CONSIDER
Martin Rosenburgh* & Andrew C. Spieler**+

INTRODUCTION

Among the most significant of the damages to result from the recent
market turmoil may be those suffered by U.S. pension plans and their
participants. In a period of little more than a year, defined benefit ("DB") plans
have been taken from fully-to-over-funded status to historically large deficit
levels.' Furthermore, many of these underfunded plans are sponsored by
companies facing drastic deterioration in financial health (and in some cases
potential bankruptcy); and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
("PBGC"), the agency responsible for insuring DB plans, is itself experiencing
significant and rising deficits. 2 The result may likely be a rising uncertainty as
to the status and future of benefits for a large number of pension plan
participants.
Perhaps what is most troubling about this development is that it
occurred "under the watch" of one of the world's most robust legal and

* Martin Rosenburgh, Esq. is an independent legal consultant specializing in securities and financial
laws.
** Andrew C. Spieler, Ph.D., CFA, FRM, Associate Professor of Finance, Frank G. Zarb School of
Business, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York.
*We thank Michael Peskin, Jim Moore, Ron Ryan, Susan Mangiero and participants at the New
York Society of Security Analysts conference on "Pensions at Risk" for their thoughtful
contributions into this article. Any errors in interpretation are the sole responsibility of the authors.
1 In a recent report by Mercer, "funded status" (defined as the ratio of assets to liabilities) for the
S&P 1500 companies declined from 104% in 2007 YE to 75% in 2008 YE. The pension funding
deficit for the same group is estimated to be $409 billion as of 2008 YE. In addition, U.S. pension
related expenses are estimated to increase from approximately $10 billion in 2008 to $70 billion in
2009. Published by Mercer on January 7, 2009, reported by Pension & Benefits Daily on January 8,
2009.
2 The PBGC is currently experiencing $11.2 Billion deficit. See "PBGC Premium Boost Outgoing PBGC chief Millard pushes to strengthen agency's financial footing", Pension &
Investments, January 20, 2009.
3 See Note 1.
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regulatory frameworks, designed to protect against this very harm - that of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").4 With ERISA
provisions governing virtually every aspect of pension plan entitlement and
operation, and administrative and enforcement responsibility shared by three
U.S. agencies (i.e., the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"), the U.S. Treasury
and the PBGC), three questions immediately come to mind: i) how is such
significant DB plan risk exposure (and consequential large losses) permissible
under ERISA? (in short- how could this sort of thing happen?), ii) are there
safeguards available which could have been (or could be in the future)
implemented?, and iii) if so, is someone responsible for failing to take them?
The answers to these questions are found in a review of the applicable
law governing the investment of pension plan assets, as well as in consideration
of industry practices and available investment solutions. In summary, we find
the following:
1. Notwithstanding the fact that plan investment decisionmakers are "fiduciaries" under ERISA, subject to a number of
stringent standards regarding conduct and decision-making
(e.g., the statutory duty of the "Prudent Man Standard of
Care"), plan fiduciaries have been afforded a great deal of
freedom under ERISA in their choices regarding plan
investment strategy.
2. Pension solutions experts offer safeguards against the
forms of defined benefit plan-related risk experienced during
the past year, in hedging-based investment strategies called
"Liability Driven Investing" ("LDI").
3. Although applicable law is sparse and uncertain, it does
appear plausible for ERISA fiduciary liability to arise in
connection with a failure to adopt such safeguards,

4 As amended. ..... that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and

stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and
their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States,
and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the
equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a), ERISA § 2(a)
Congressional findings and declaration of policy.
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particularly where the decision-making process involved in
choice or monitoring of investment strategy is found to be
inadequate.
I. How IS SUCH SIGNIFICANT DB PLAN RISK EXPOSURE, AND CONSEQUENTIAL
LARGE LOSSES, PERMISSIBLE UNDER ERISA? (I.E, How COULD THIS SORT OF
THING HAPPEN?)

For the groundwork of understanding of what is, and is not,
permissible with respect to plan investment decision-making, one must begin
with a review of the ERISA statute itself and interpretive DOL regulations,
ending with remedies available under ERISA and common law.
A. ERISA Section 404(a) "Prudent Man Standard of Care"
ERISA sets forth a "Prudent Man Standard of Care" governing all
fiduciary behavior, including investment decisions. 5 Fiduciaries are required to
act
"with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
of an enterprise of a like character and with like
conduct
6
aims."
Viewed generally by courts as adoption of the "prudent person"
standard from the common law of trusts, these and the other provisions of
ERISA §404 are interpreted under a significant and growing body of federal
common law of ERISA.7
In addition, a fiduciary is required to "discharge his duties with respect
to a plan solely in the interest" of the plan participants, for the "exclusive
purpose" of providing benefits and "defraying reasonable expenses" of plan
administration. 8 Investment decision-making is also subject to a diversification
ERISA § 404(a).
6 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).
7 See Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489(1996).
' ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A). Sometimes referred to as the "exclusive benefit" rule, this has been
viewed as incorporating a trust law "duty of loyalty".
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requirement "so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so", 9 and must also be made "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan."' t
DOL Regulation 2550.404a-1, referred to by courts as the "prudence
rule", l provides guidance for what is deemed a "prudent" discharge of duties
under ERISA Section 404(a) with respect to an "investment" or "investment
course of action". 12 Such requirements are deemed satisfied
"if the fiduciary... has given appropriate consideration to
those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such
fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should
know are relevant to the particular investment or investment
course of action involved, including the role the investment or
investment course of action plays in that portion of the plan's
investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has
investment duties; and . . .has acted accordingly" (emphasis
added).13
The regulation defines "appropriate consideration" as including (but
not limited to) the following two components:
A. A determination by the fiduciary that the particular
investment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of
the portfolio... to further the purposes of the plan, taking into
consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or
other return) associated with the investment or investment
course of action, and
B. Consideration of the following factors as they relate to
such portion of the portfolio:
i. The composition of the portfolio with regard to
diversification;

9 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).

'0ERISA § 404(a)(I)(D).
" California Ironworkers v. Loomis Savles & Co., 259 F.3d 1036, 1043 (91h Cir. 2001).
12 DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1. The DOL is the U.S. agency authorized to enforce ERISA fiduciary
requirements.
13 DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol8/iss1/4

4

Rosenburgh and Spieler: 21St Century Pensions: The Risk, the Hedge and the Duty to Consid
21 ST CENTURY PENSIONS

ii.The liquidity and current rates of return of the portfolio
relative to the anticipated cash flow requirements of the
plan, and
iii.The projected return of the14 portfolio relative to the
funding objectives of the plan.
By directing an investment (or investment course of action) be
"reasonably designed as part of the portfolio", this guidance has been viewed by
15
courts as the adoption by the DOL of the Modern Portfolio Theory.
Accordingly, risk and return characteristics of investment choices are held to be
properly considered in light of their operation within the portfolio as a whole,
taking into account the additional appropriate factors (e.g., diversification,
liquidity and current returns relative to anticipated cash
flow requirements, and
16
projected returns relative to plan funding objectives).
These statutory and regulatory provisions form the basis for judicial
review of plan investment decision-making. It is noteworthy that the regulatory
"safe harbor" outlined above is based on an "appropriate consideration" of
qualitative and quantitative factors deemed relevant and generally in accordance
with Modern Portfolio Theory. 17 This emphasis on the investment process is
also reflected in case law, which holds generally that review of an investment or
course of action for prudence purposes is focused on the procedure employed,
not on the outcome yielded.'" Courts have stated the rule as follows:
4 DOL Reg. 2550.404a- 1. The regulation's preamble indicates that this guidance is not intended to

provide an exclusive manner of compliance with prudence requirements: "It should also be noted
that the Department does not view compliance with the provisions of the regulation as necessarily
constituting the exclusive method for satisfying the requirements of the "prudence" rule. Rather, the
regulation is in the nature of a "safe harbor" provision; it is the opinion of the Department that
fiduciaries who comply with the provisions of the regulation will have satisfied the requirements of
the "prudence" rule, but no opinion is expressed in the regulation as to the status of activities
undertaken or performed that do not so comply."
15DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, 497 F.3d 410, 423 (4th Cir. Va. 2007).
16DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1 Preamble (An investment "should not be deemed to be imprudent merely
because the investment, standing alone, would have, for example, a relatively high degree of risk.)
Courts have drawn a distinction between this review of an investment's risk, to be determined
within the context of the whole portfolio, and the requirement that each and every investment or
course of action be "prudent" on an individual basis. ("That is, a fiduciary must initially determine,
and continue to monitor, the prudence of each investment option available to plan participants.")
DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, 497 F.3d 410, 423.
" DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1.
'8 See Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 1987) (a failure to follow reasonable
procedures is imprudent even if the fiduciaries reached a reasonable decision). See also Anderson
v. Mortell, 722 F. Supp. 462, 470 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (the duty of fiduciary is to conduct a prudent,
independent investigation, not to achieve "the highest possible price" in sale of a plan asset).
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When deciding whether a plan fiduciary has acted prudently,
a "[c]ourt must inquire whether the individual trustees, at the
time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed
the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the
investment and to structure the investment." (internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, a court must ask
whether the fiduciary engaged in a reasoned decision-making
process, consistent with that of a "prudent man acting in like
capacity"'1 9
Notwithstanding the stringent level of care and consideration dictated
under the forgoing ERISA prudence requirements, 20 plan fiduciaries have been
afforded a great deal of freedom under ERISA in their choices regarding plan
investment technique and strategy. In the Preamble to the foregoing regulation,
the DOL indicates an intent to avoid limitation of "the investments, classes of
investment, or investment techniques that might be permissible under the
'prudence' rule. No such list could be complete; moreover, the Department
does not intend
to create or suggest a 'legal list' of investments for plan
21
fiduciaries."
Ironically, the clearest indication of regulatory intent on the freedom to
choose strategy comes from a DOL Advisory Opinion regarding the
permissibility of use of the "Liability Driven Investing" pension portfolio
management strategy:
Within the framework of ERISA's prudence, exclusive
purpose and diversification requirements, the Department
believes that plan fiduciaries have broad discretion in defining
investment strategies appropriate to their plans. In this
regard, the Department does not believe that there is anything
in the statute or the regulations that would limit a plan
fiduciary's ability to take into account the risks associated
with benefit liabilities or how those risks relate to the

'9 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B). DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, 497 F.3d at 421, citing Flanigan v. GE, 242
F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001).
20 See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (the

court emphasizes the high degree of care required under ERISA's prudence standard, noting that
ERISA fiduciary duties are "the highest known to the law"). See also Donovan v. Mazzola, 716
F.2d at 1231.
" DOL Reg. 2550.404a- I Explanatory Preamble.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol8/iss1/4

6

Rosenburgh and Spieler: 21St Century Pensions: The Risk, the Hedge and the Duty to Consid
21 ST CENTURY PENSIONS
portfolio management in designing an investment strategy. 22
There is, however, one noteworthy piece of DOL guidance weighing in on the
use of a particular type of investment - a 1996 DOL Information Letter
regarding the use of derivatives. 23 In the letter, guidance is provided with
respect to additional factors which should be considered in a decision to use
derivatives (or in implementing and/or maintaining a derivatives-based
strategy). Among the factors to consider are "..sufficient information to allow
an independent analysis of the credit risk and market risk being undertaken by
the plan..", to be determined by an "appropriate methodology used to evaluate
market risk." Toward this end, the letter notes that "stress simulations are
particularly important because assumptions which may be valid for normal
markets may not be valid in abnormal markets, resulting in significant losses."
In addition, the letter instructs:
As part of its evaluation of the investment, a fiduciary must
analyze the operational risks being undertaken in making the
investment. Among other things, the fiduciary should
determine whether it possesses the requisite expertise,
knowledge, and information to understand and analyze the
nature of the risks and potential returns involved in a
particular derivative investment. In particular, the fiduciary
must determine whether the plan has adequate information
and risk management systems in place given the nature, size
and complexity of the plan's derivatives activity, and whether
the plan fiduciary has personnel who are competent to
manage these systems.24
While there is no indication in this guidance that derivatives are
deemed more "risky" or inherently less prudent than other investment types, 25 it
does suggest that derivatives usage would require a specific form of expertise
that may not be present at all plans, and that a layer of due diligence would
likely be required above and beyond that with respect to other investments.
Accordingly, without providing any significant guidance regarding the
selection of portfolio investment strategies (other than with respect to the use of
derivatives or the LDI portfolio approach), there is an inference from the
22 DOL
23 DOL
24

Advisory Opinion 2006-08A.
Information Letter to Honorable Eugene A. Ludwig, dated March 21, 1996.

id.

25The letter states that "investments in derivatives are subject to the fiduciary responsibility rules in
the same manner as are any other plan investments." Id.
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foregoing regulatory guidance that the "tried and true" or traditional approaches
to portfolio management may provide a "less burdensome" or "safer" means of
satisfying ERISA prudence requirements.
B. ERISA Civil Enforcement of Fiduciary Breaches
ERISA Section 409 "Liability for breach of fiduciary duty" provides
that, with respect to breaches of fiduciary duty, fiduciaries are personally liable
"to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach.",26 ERISA Section 502 "Civil enforcement" provides empowerment to
bring civil actions to enforce rights under ERISA.27
With respect to
enforcement of liability for fiduciary breaches (under ERISA Section 409),
actions may brought by "the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary....28

Accordingly participants, in addition to the DOL, are among parties
who may bring civil actions to enforce breaches of fiduciary duty and recoup
losses to the plan. 29 In this manner, ERISA Section 502(a)(2) arguably
enhances the enforcement power under ERISA by "deputizing" as-enforcers of
fiduciary liability the large constituency of U.S. plan participants. Historically,
however, a significant limitation on such actions by participants, seeking to
recover losses with respect to DB plans, has been found in "Article III
Constitutional Standing". Under the doctrine of Article III Constitutional
Standing, a plaintiff must have "suffered an injury in fact". 30 Such "injury" has
been held by some courts as lacking where, notwithstanding the losses suffered
to a DB plan, the plan remained adequately funded to pay "all accrued or
accumulated benefits".31
In large part for these reasons, the responsibility for enforcing rights
with respect to DB plan investment decision-making has been left largely to the
DOL. However, as indicated above, the DOL has traditionally refrained from
prohibiting (or requiring) specific types of investment strategy, and would
26 ERISA § 409.

27ERISA § 502.
28 ERISA § 502(a)(2).
29 Id.

30 Harley v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 284 F.3d 901,906.

31 Harley v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 284 F.3d at 907. See also Hughes Aircraft
v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 440 ("Given the employer's obligation to make up any shortfall, no plan
member has a claim to any particular asset that composes a part of the plan's general asset pool").
However, the rule governing Constitutional Standing is far from settled, with inconsistent positions
taken among different Circuits. See Amicus Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Harley v. Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Co., 284 F.3d 901.
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therefore not likely bring an action where the investment course of action
arising in an alleged breach of duty was the adherence to a "tried and true" or
traditional portfolio allocation approach (unless there was some other visible
failure in the investment decision-making process). Accordingly, significant
DB plan risk exposure (and consequential large losses) continues to remain
permissible, and quite likely, under ERISA.
Recent events, however, may have altered the landscape of
enforcement and litigation. As mentioned above, plan funding levels have
deteriorated significantly over the past twelve to eighteen months.32
Accordingly, there is likely to be a growing universe of DB plan participants for
whom receipt of benefits is uncertain, and who would therefore satisfy any
applicable review of Constitutional Standing.
II. ARE THERE SAFEGUARDS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN?

The most significant form of risk that arises in connection with DB
plan funding and investment is a function of the deviation or "mismatching"
that can occur between plan assets and liabilities. 34 Traditional pension
investment performance measurement (or "benchmark" development) has been
primarily "asset based" (i.e., based on performance of comparable assets in the
market, often represented by indices). However, due to market fluctuations,
both plan assets and liabilities can experience significant volatility, and not
necessarily in the same direction. This difference is often referred to as
"tracking error to liabilities" or "surplus volatility". 35 This volatility is largely
driven by changes in interest rates, which in turn cause changes in the present
value of plan liabilities and asset values of plan-held fixed income investments
(and often occur in connection with volatility in other asset types as well, such
as equities).
Safeguards against this risk are available in the plan investment36
industry, in strategy primarily known as Liability Driven Investing ("LDI").
The LDI strategy has two essential components: i) build a benchmark based on
timing and amount of plan liabilities, not on the targeted return of assets, and ii)

32 See Note 1.
33 See Notes 30-31.
3' See Rene Martel, FSA, CFA, "LDI: Not One Magic Bullet" (Viewpoints, PIMCO Oct. 2008).

35 id.
36 Id. ("With better understanding and knowledge, there is now a broader recognition that LDI
is
not a product. Instead, more and more people accept LDI as a process or framework to assess the
risk position of defined benefit plans relative to their liabilities in order to identify the investment
strategy that is best suited to the sponsor's objectives.").
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construct a fixed income portfolio designed to "track" the benchmark.37 In
order to obtain maximum risk reduction benefits, derivatives such as interest
rate swaps may also be used (but are not necessary). Furthermore, in order to
generate sufficiently high returns, a remaining portion of the portfolio would be
allocated to riskier assets such as equities (but this portion is much smaller than
the traditional allocation).
Adoption of such a strategy can result in significant reduction in risk
associated with a DB plan's funded status.38 This is largely due to the fact that
investments are structured to provide returns and income that match the timing
39
and amounts of the plan's liabilities, so that the plan is essentially "hedged".
For those plans considering the use of interest rate derivatives in
connection with such a strategy, there are likely to be additional considerations
(some of which are outlined in the DOL Information Letter regarding the use of
derivatives, discussed above). 40 For instance, derivative positions can result in
interim cash flow requirements to the portfolio, which fluctuate in accordance
with interest rate changes. Such impacts could (and should) be modeled under
different interest rate scenarios. 41 In addition, plan fiduciaries may not possess
the expertise with which to understand how these investments
operate and
42
would impact the plan, and therefore may require outside advice.
Accordingly, safeguards to DB plan underfunding do exist in the form
of hedging-based strategies such as LDI. Although the strategy can be
implemented through the use of derivatives, such usage is not required and may
be limited in accordance with the needs, expertise and risk tolerances of the
plan.
The following hypothetical should provide a better understanding as to

37 See "Liability-Driven Investing: PIMCO's Innovative Approach to Custom Solutions", PIMCO

Product Focus, May 2007.
38 Funded status represents the economic position of the pension plan: fair value of the assets present value of the anticipated pension obligations (using several managerial and actuarial
assumptions).
39 One can think of a plan's liabilities as similar to bond investment but in reverse: various payment
requirements are expected into the future at different times. Accordingly, LDI develops fixed
income investment solutions which provide income to match these expected liabilities.
40 DOL Information Letter to Honorable Eugene A. Ludwig, dated March 21, 1996.
41 As discussed in the Letter, such modeling, or "stress testing", would likely be considered a
necessary part of a prudent investment process. Id.
42See Susan Mangiero, Ph.d, ALFA, AVA, CFA, FRM, and Society of Actuaries Joint Pension Risk
Research Project, "Pension Risk Management: Derivatives, Fiduciary Duty and Process" (October
2008) (In response to the question "What reasons account for your decision not to use derivative
instruments to manage the risk of your defined benefit plan(s)?", "Lack of Fiduciary
Understanding", "Perception of Excess Risk" and "[DB] Plan Risk Not Considered Significant"
were the most frequent responses.).
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how a plan might be faced with the type of investment decision-making
described in this article. It also may serve to highlight several of the issues
raised under ERISA, which will be explored further below.
Part I. The Proposal
You sit on the investment committee for your company's
multi-billion dollar defined benefit pension plan. It is
Spring 2007 and the plan is "fully funded" (pursuant to
ERISA funding requirements) and in excellent financial
health. With a portfolio allocation of 65% equities, the
plan's strong investment performance can be attributed in
large part to that of the S&P 500, which has earned
double-digit annualized returns for the previous five
years. Notwithstanding the success of your current
portfolio performance, the committee is being presented
with a portfolio allocation strategy called "Liability
Driven Investing" which would represent a radical
change.
In a presentation to the committee, the new investment
advisor candidates argue that the plan funding level is
exposed to a series of substantial risks. First, the plan is
exposed to significant asset-based volatility associated
with the plan's equities and other "risky" assets. Another
primary risk arises from the volatility in interest rates,
which causes the present value of the plans liabilities to
fluctuate. It is explained that these could be greatly
reduced, if not largely eliminated, through the use of a
"hedging" strategy:
-First, a new performance benchmark for the plan would
be created, based not on investment indices (such as the
S&P 500 or the Lehman Aggregate Bond indices) but on
the plan's liabilities. This would be accomplished by
constructing a model of the timing and amount of the
plan's forecasted future benefit payments.
-The investment advisor would create a portfolio of fixed
income investments, with incoming interest and cash
flows designed to "match" the (anticipated) outgoing
benefit payments of the plan. Portfolio performance

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009
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would be measured against the new liability-based
benchmark.
-A portion of the plan assets would remain in equities and
other asset classes intended to yield higher/excess
returns, but this percentage would be far less than the
plan's traditional allocation. The end result would be a
portfolio with overall lower returns than the current plan,
although likely exhibiting less volatility as measured
against the plan's liabilities.
Part II. The Decision
After reviewing the proposal, there were aspects that
appealed to you and the committee, but it was ultimately
rejected (at least for the time being). One of the primary
concerns raised was that the strategy seemed too
"complex", and the committee was uncertain that they
possessed the expertise necessary to approve, and then
adequately monitor, the strategy implementation. There
was also discussion of the potential use of "interest rate
swaps" in the fixed income portion of the portfolio.
Although it was advised that derivative usage would not
be necessary in order to implement the strategy, it was
ultimately recommended; and there were a number of the
committee members who were uncomfortable with
derivatives generally (again, largely due to a lack of
committee expertise and understanding of the risks
involved).
There was one other concern that weighed on you. In
order to implement this strategy, you would be required,
pursuant to financial accounting standards, to make a
significant downward adjustment to your expected return
(The lower
assumption for the plan's investments.
expected return would result from shifting asset
allocation away from the historically higher performing
equities asset class toward fixed income). This would
have an immediate negative impact on company reported
earnings, an outcome with which you were certain would
please no one in upper management.
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Spring, 2009
It is two years later, Spring 2009 and, after an unexpected
credit crunch and subsequent market downturn, your
company's defined benefit plan is now seriously
underfunded. Not only has your plan portfolio lost in
excess of 50% of its value from two years ago, but plan
liabilities, calculated on a present value basis, have
actually risen (in part due to current interest rates being at
historically low levels).
There is now significant
uncertainty that the plan (or the company) has the ability
to pay promised pension benefits when due (and there is
informal discussion about termination of the plan). You
are asking yourself now whether the committee was too
hasty when it rejected the "Liability Driven Investing"
approach two years ago. Of course, hindsight is always
20/20 and your plan has fared no worse than a large
number of other U.S pension plans. Notwithstanding,
you call your attorney and ask: as pension plan
"fiduciaries" under ERISA, could the investment
committee members be liable for failing to adequately
consider a hedging strategy before rejecting it?
1II.

IF SO, IS SOMEONE RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILING TO TAKE THEM?

As discussed above, fiduciary duties with respect to plan investments
are grounded in a prudent investment process,43 with an emphasis placed on an
"appropriate consideration"'44 and a "reasoned decision-making process" '45 given
to investments and investment courses of action involved.46 The question
presented by this article is whether fiduciary liability could arise in connection
with a failure to provide such adequate process in considering: i) existing
pension portfolio-related risk exposure and/or ii) employing a strategy to reduce
such risks (i.e., through a portfolio management strategy such as LDI). Such a

43See

Notes 17-19.

44Reg. 2550.404a-1.
45 DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, 497 F.3d at 421.

It should be noted that although Reg. 2550.404a-1 is provided as a "safe harbor" or nonexclusive means of satisfying prudence requirements, courts have looked to its provisions for
guidance in determining whether investment actions were "prudent". See California Ironworkers v.
Loomis Savles & Co., 259 F.3d at1044.
46
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failure could arguably arise in one of two decision-making contexts. First, as
described in the hypothetical above, it could be alleged that plan fiduciaries
rejected without an adequate process the proposal of such a strategy that was
presented for consideration. Second, a claim could arise that fiduciaries failed
to "appropriately consider" significant risk exposure in their existing traditional
portfolio, and subsequently failed to pursue, or look into, LDI strategy solutions
as a means of reducing that risk. In order to review the validity of potential
claims, there are several issues to consider
Typically, investment-related breaches are found to arise in connection
with the entering into, or adoption of, discrete investments or investment
courses of action.47 However, the question presented here is more likely to arise
from some degree of failure to act (i.e., by failing to change existing portfolio
allocations and/or failing to engage in a hedging strategy). Accordingly, in
review of such claim, a court may look
for authority supporting liability for
48
what may be argued is a failure to act.
In addition, as discussed above, ERISA neither restricts nor obligates
fiduciaries in the types of investments or strategies which they may adopt.49 A
breach is not likely to arise from the failure to act itself (e.g., the choice not to
adopt a hedging strategy). Instead, liability would likely be limited to instances
where such investment inaction was found to be the result of a failure in the
consideration and decision-making process (e.g., with respect to portfolio risk
and available hedging strategies).50 Applicable law indicates several principals
which are likely to bear upon such a review.
First, ERISA prudence requirements broadly cover all aspects of the
plan investment process, extending far beyond initial decisions to enter into
investments. Under the "prudence rule" DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1 (discussed

47 See, for instance, Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d at 1232 (The issue before the court was

"whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed
the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the
investment.").
48 It is also possible for a claim to be made that the earlier-constructed traditional portfolio
allocation is itself the investment course of action with respect to which a failure to give appropriate
consideration. This is unlikely to succeed, however, as courts would review the decision-making in
light of the information available at the time of the investment, when the availability of LDI and
other hedging strategies was likely much less prevalent in the industry. See Note 19 above. See
also Roth v. Sawver-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he prudent
person standard is not concerned with results; rather it is a test of how the fiduciary acted viewed
from the perspective of the time of the challenged decision rather than from the vantage point of
hindsight." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49 See Notes 22-24 above.
50 E.g., by giving "appropriate consideration" to the applicable investment or investment course of

action and available information, pursuant to Reg. 2550.404a- 1.
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above), the "appropriate consideration" requirement applies to both
"investment[s]" and "investment course[s] of action"; and an "investment
course of action" is defined as "any series or program of investments or actions
related to a fiduciary's performance of his investment duties". 51 Although the
scope of this definition has not been reviewed by courts, it is reasonable to
expect that the term "investment course of action" could be held to include a
portfolio management strategy, including the manner of benchmarking overall
plan investment performance. 52 Furthermore, courts have recognized an
ongoing "duty to monitor" investments, notwithstanding delegation of
management authority to third parties.53
Second, applicable law generally holds that prudent investment process
is reviewed from the standpoint of experts and in light of available industry
standards. Courts hold that the ERISA prudent person standard is applied from
the perspective of "a prudent fiduciary with experience dealing with a similar
enterprise".i
Where fiduciaries lack expertise in a specific area being
considered, they have been held to have an affirmative duty to seek out such
expertise.55 In addition, in review of whether a fiduciary's methods employed
and information reviewed satisfy ERISA prudence requirements, courts have
looked at prevailing industry methods and standards.56 This essentially means
that although standards for ERISA prudence requirements may be reviewed by

51 Reg. 2550.404a-1(c)(2).
52 Support for such interpretation may be found in the regulation itself, requiring for consideration,
"i. The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification, ii. The liquidity and current rates
of return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan, and iii. The
projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan", which are generally
critical components in the development of a portfolio strategy and in LDI strategies in particular.
See Notes 34-38.
53 Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278 (Defendants failed to monitor the fund's solvency and adjust
levels. Defendants failed to utilize due care in selecting and monitoring the fund's service providers
and in reviewing the performance of trustees.). See also Harley v. Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Company, 42 F. Supp. 2d 898 (D. Minn. 1999) (The court held that the trustees'
delegation of responsibility to an investment advisor did not relieve the trustees of their fiduciary
obligation to monitor investments.).
5 U.S. v. Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York, 909 F. Supp. 882, 886, citing
Marshall v. Snyder, 1 Empl. Ben. Cases (BNA) 1878, 1886 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
55 Katsaros v. Cody, 568 F. Supp. 360, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affirmed in relevant part, 744 F.2d
270, citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272-73).
56 Analyzing "appropriate consideration" under DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1, Ironworkers v. Loomis
Sayles & Co., 259 F.3d at 1044 ("..the district court found more persuasive Loomis' evidence that
the Bloomberg system was the tool prevalently used in the industry and that only a few portfolio
managers were using OAS analysis, and it made factual findings to that effect."). See also DiFelice
v. U.S. Airways, 436 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.V.A., 2006) ("In the present context, this means that U.S.
Airways was required to act pursuant to the standards of the investment industry...").
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attorneys and in the courtroom, they are ultimately determined by the
investment industry and its experts.
Furthermore, the common law of trusts provides some precedent for
fiduciary liability in connection with a failure to adopt hedging strategies. 57 It is

not uncommon in analysis of ERISA claims, for courts to look to trust law for
guidance (to the extent not inconsistent with ERISA).5 8
Based upon the foregoing, to the extent that a court found that
prevailing industry standards included knowledge of pension portfolio-related
risks, such as interest rate risk or portfolio tracking error, and risk-hedging
solutions such as LDI, it is plausible that a court could find that any wholesale
rejection of these concepts could constitute an imprudent investment decision
(i.e., via a failure to give "appropriate consideration"). Furthermore, as
indicated above, it is unlikely that a lack of expertise would provide defense
against such a claim.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in addition to the prudence
requirements discussed above, the ERISA investment decision-making
processes is also subject to the ERISA "Exclusive Benefit" rule. Stated above,
ERISA requires that a fiduciary "discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest" of the plan participants, for the "exclusive purpose" of
providing benefits and "defraying reasonable expenses" of plan
administration. 59 Accordingly, in their consideration of DB investment
strategies, fiduciaries are not permitted to take into account factors other than
those involved in provision of benefits under the plan. Such impermissible
factors might include the impact of certain investment strategies on the financial
statement reporting of the plan sponsor. An example of this concern was
described in the previous Hypothetical, where a reduction in the plan's
allocation to equities would result in lower reported earnings (due to changes in
plan asset expected return assumptions). 60 To the extent such influences were
57 See Randall H. Borkus, A TRUST FIDUCIARY'S DUTY TO IMPLEMENT CAPITAL

PRESERVATION STRATEGIES USING FINANCIAL DERIVATIVE TECHNIQUES, 36 Real
Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 127, Spring, 2001, analyzing Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) ("The court entered specific findings and conclusions determining that the directors breached
their duties by retaining a manager inexperienced in hedging; failing to maintain reasonable
supervision over him; and failing to attain knowledge of the basic fundamentals of hedging to be
able to direct the hedging activities and supervise the manager properly.").
58See California Ironworkers v. Loomis Sayles & Co., 259 F.3d at1047, citing Harris Trust and
Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000) ("The common law of trusts
is incorporated into analysis of ERISA claims unless inconsistent with the statute's language,
structure or purpose.").
'9ERISA §404(a)(l)(A).
60 This factor could in certain instances bear significant weight, as reported earnings may be
impacted significantly from changes in the expected return assumptions regarding plan investments.
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found present in an investment decision-making process, fiduciary liability may
be more likely to arise.
CONCLUSION

DB plans serve the important function of enabling employers to
assume risk in connection with employee retirement income. This past year has
demonstrated that, notwithstanding this "assumption of risk", there is still
enormous risk exposure present within our defined benefit pension plan system,
and the resulting volatility will most certainly impact retiree benefits. An
underlying question presented in this article is whether this exposure is
necessary.
To the extent that viable solutions in the reduction of DB plan risk
exist and are readily available within the investment industry, plan fiduciaries
may wish to consider them carefully and thoroughly. As to whether and in what
contexts fiduciaries could be held liable for failing to do so, this issue remains
uncertain. However, as discussed above, "consideration" lies at the heart of
prudence under ERISA. Applicable case law makes clear that such process
must be informed by relevant expertise and knowledge of industry practices
(and not be influenced by factors other than those involved in the provision of
plan benefits). As the risks inherent in DB plan funding continue to be realized,
and as the pension investment industry continues to develop the solutions to
those risks, it is not unreasonable to expect that their appropriate consideration
will become viewed as required components of the prudent investment process.

See generally FAS 158. See also David Zion, CFA, CPA, The Magic of Pension Accounting, Part
III. See also Susan Mangiero, Ph.d, AIFA, AVA, CFA, FRM, and Society of Actuaries Joint
Pension Risk Research Project, "Pension Risk Management: Derivatives, Fiduciary Duty and
Process" (In response to the question "What defined benefit plan risk areas concern you?",
"Accounting Impact" was the number one risk concern among DB plan sponsors.).
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